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SEPARATE IS INHERENTLY UNEQUAL,
UNLESS YOU'RE RELIGIOUS: THE PECULIAR
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS
SEGREGATION
FRANCISKA COLEMAN

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explain how a relative newcomer to
constitutional anti-discrimination jurisprudence, secular identity, has
managed to gamer a far higher degree of protection than historically
suspect classes, such as race and gender. It attributes this phenomenon to the "separate but equal" model of equality inherent in the
doctrine of "separation of church and state." It notes that, despite
acknowledging that government segregation is per se unequal in the
Brown decision, the Supreme Court has continued to enforce
religious segregation as a requirement of the Establishment Clause.
In doing so, the Court has created a new type of discrimination
based on level of religious exercise. After comparing protection of
secular identity to the protections afforded to race and gender, this
article recommends that the Court abandon the wall metaphor and
its progeny and apply the equal protection analysis it uses to secure
gender equality to secure religious equality.

Franciska Coleman is an assistant professor at Hanyang University School of
Law in Seoul, South Korea, where she teaches American Constitutional Law and
the American Bill of Rights. She received her J.D. from Harvard Law School and
her Ph.D. in Education from the University of Pennsylvania.
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INTRODUCTION

"Government practices that purport to celebrate or
acknowledge events [of significance to white racial
groups] must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny." 1
"The effect [of governmental celebration of Columbus
Day on Native American groups, as well as on those
who may reject discovery theories], is to convey the
message that their views are not similarly worthy of
public recognition nor entitled to public support." 2

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (replacing religious references
with racial references).
2 Cnty. of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (replacing religious
references with racial references).
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"[C]onfining the government's own [celebration of its
heritage to its race-neutral aspects ... permits the govern-

ment to acknowledge [its history] without expressing
[allegiance to any particular racial group]."
Despite a civil war, three constitutional amendments, and a
civil rights movement, one would search judicial opinions in vain
for the robust protection accorded to racial minorities in the above
quotes. Such protection is only accorded to non-religious minorities.
Under current judicial interpretations of the First Amendment,
crosses and criches in public parks and courthouses alienate the
non-religious and must be removed.4 Confederate flags and celebrations of Christopher Columbus alienate many African Americans
and Native Americans, but the alienation of these groups does not
create a constitutional issue. Thus, though the Constitution now
guarantees Santa and Frosty a place in the manager,6 Frederick
Douglas need not be given space in memorials to Jefferson Davis,
nor must famous Native American chiefs be included in Columbus
Day celebrations.
This seems to suggest that non-Christians are entitled to
greater protection from feelings of exclusion and discrimination than
Native Americans and African-Americans. One cannot help but
wonder why. Is the celebration of the birth of Christ more offensive
to non-Christians than the celebration of Columbus's "discovery" of
3 Id. at 611 (replacing religious references with racial references).
4 Id. at 579 (finding that a crkche displayed in a courthouse violated the

Establishment Clause).
See N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no
violation of equal protection for African-Americans when the confederate flag is
flown from the state capital, despite the flag's long association with the ideas of
white supremacy and black inferiority); see also Bill Gallo, War of the Words,
DENVER WESTWORD NEws, Oct. 6, 2005 availableat http://www.westword.coni

2005-10-06/news/war-of-the-word/2/ (discussing the Native American view of
Christopher Columbus as a monster and a mass murderer, and the arrests of
individuals protesting Columbus Day parades).
6 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598 (placing significance on the fact that no
secular symbols were in the crkche display, and concluding that their presence in
other parts of the courthouse was insufficient).
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America is to Native Americans or than the celebration of a state's
right to practice slavery is to African-Americans? What makes
government celebration of the religious aspects of a secularized
"religious" holiday more constitutionally suspect than government
celebration of the invasion and extermination of countless Native
American tribes or government affirmation of a right to reduce
African-Americans to chattel? If decisions of how and whether a
community will celebrate Columbus Day or its confederate heritage
are left to the discretion of the political branches, why not decisions
about how and whether a community will celebrate Christmas and
Hanukah? Why does the Constitution only proscribe offensive
religious displays while allowing other displays that are equally (if
not more) offensive, and that have also have much closer connections to governmental persecution and oppression?
This article seeks to explore how secular identity, a relative
new-comer to constitutional anti-discrimination jurisprudence, has
managed to garner a far higher degree of protection in the passive
display context than historically suspect classes, such as race and
gender. It does so in four steps. First, this article discusses the rise of
"separation of church and state" as the constitutional framework for
the religion clauses, its ideological similarity to the doctrine of
"separate but equal" and its permutation into the Lemon and
endorsement tests. Part II discusses the doctrinal incoherence that
has resulted from the use of the "separate but equal" framework in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It focuses on the contradictory
nature of definitions of religious neutrality that favor secular identity
over religious identity. It also addresses the constitutional paradox
created by a judicial focus on the role of belief in analyzing the Free
Exercise Clause but on the content of belief in analyzing the Establishment Clause.
In Part III, this article compares the heightened protection
given to marginalized secular identities under the principle of secularity with the protections afforded to marginalized racial and gender
identities under the principle of equality. It finds that logic, history,
and precedent are aligned against the principle of secularity as
separate from and superior to constitutional guarantees of equality.
Part III concludes that religious discrimination under the Establish-
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ment Clause should be adjudicated like all other suspect discrimination, under principles of equal protection rather than secularity. Part
IV applies an equal protection analysis to the "discrimination" inherent in passive religious displays, and finds that the constitutionality of
passive displays is non-justiciable under the equal protection clause.
II.

CREATING A SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
CHURCH AND STATE
A.

Everson v. Board ofEducation ofEwing

The earliest appearance of "separation of church and state"
as an interpretation of the Establishment Clause was the Court's
1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Educationof Ewing Township.

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Black, the Court found
that the Establishment Clause was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."' 7 The Court interpreted this to
mean that:
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws, which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
' Id. at 15-16.
7 Everson
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This is a very comprehensive list of prohibitions that seems
impossible to put into practice without an equally comprehensive
list of narrowing constructions. The fire protection analogy is
frequently deployed as a narrowing construction to show that "no
aid" cannot apply to government services. But "no aid" also cannot
apply to democratic privileges. 9 It cannot be true that the "govemment cannot participate in the affairs of any religious organization or
group;"1o for, the principles of self-govemance and equal representation limit the affairs of government to the affairs of the citizens it
represents. Can the government truly represent religious people
while excluding their interests from its consideration or notice?
The "no-aid" doctrine is particularly problematic given the
Everson Court's simultaneous concession that a state is not precluded "from extending its general State law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious belief."" This suggests that,
sometimes, the government and its aid are permitted to cross the
wall of separation in the name of equal citizenship, and, other times
it is not, while leaving the distinction between these two situations
unclear. One thing is clear from this caveat, if government aid and
influence can pass through the wall if they have the proper credentials-i.e. if they are part of an appropriately general and comprehensive scheme-Jefferson's Establishment Clause wall is more
properly considered an equal protection gate. The majority resists
this interpretation, however, and the dissent correctly notes that the
conflation of a general rule of no aid and a general rule of aid only
in the proper circumstances strikes a discordant note that renders the
decision internally inconsistent. 12
9 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("A law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense.").
10Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.

" Id.
12 Id. at 19 ("the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. The case
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This inconsistency is both surprising and unnecessary, for in
1947, the Establishment Clause was virgin constitutional soil. Most
religion clause cases prior to that point had focused on the boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause, so Justice Black had wide discretion in shaping the contours of the Establishment Clause prohibition,
and faced no pressures to sacrifice coherence in order to reconcile
competing precedents. Though, as a textualist, Justice Black looked
to the Constitution itself and to founding era documents to give
content to the broad constitutional outline, textualism alone did not
demand choosing Jefferson's wall metaphor (expressed in an informal personal communication fourteen years after the Amendment
was passed) over Madison's more contemporaneous statements
made during the actual debates over the religion clauses. This is
particularly true given that Madison defined the Establishment
Clause as meaning "that Congress should not establish a religion and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience," 13 an articulation more consistent with Justice Black's actual application of the
clause in Everson, than the wall metaphor on which he purported to
rely. However, the wall metaphor had a significant advantage over
Madison's debate remarks-its ideological resonance with existing
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment that constitutionalized
minority segregation.
B.

Religious Segregation in the Era of Plessy
v. Ferguson

In 1947, Plessy v. Fergusonwas fifty-one years old. 14 That
means that, at the time Everson was argued, the equality of segregation had been a constitutional fact for over half a century. Every
sitting justice had come of age and studied law in a system where
the segregation of a minority group against their will was neither
unjust nor discriminatory, but a practical necessity. To many in
which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented.'").
13 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834).
14 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
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society at that time, African Americans were the "Other," alien in
their appearance and culture and thus potentially unwilling to play
by the social rules established by the White majority. Fear of the
non-conformity of African Americans made it seem logical to
separate them from White people and relegate them to a special
"Black" sphere removed from wider society. The resulting White
supremacy was viewed as the natural result of the intellectual, political, and social superiority of White individuals, not of discriminatory governmental policies. Indeed, any argument that there was
injustice or unfairness in limiting the civil and political access rights
of African Americans in order to maintain the existing social order
was incoherent, as there was no room in the dominant paradigm for
the equality of Whites and Blacks.
Part of the longevity of segregation, however, lay in the fact
that it was not inconsistent with equality for African Americans
within theirsphere. Outside of their sphere, civil and political power
in the hands of African Americans was viewed as a threat to the
existing social order and to democracy itself. Thus, under the
perceived wisdom of the time, the most effective and equitable way
to deal with the growing power and influence of those who were
non-conforming was equality through segregation.
As a result of such reasoning, strong enforcement of the
segregation paradigm did not occur until emancipation and reconstruction threatened to empower African Americans to achieve gains
in political society that threatened the existing power structure; so
too, strong enforcement of segregation against religious others did
not displace broad free exercise rights until religious immigrants
began to achieve political gains in civil society that threatened the
existing power structure. The doctrine adopted to deal with the
threat posed by the Catholic Other was the same one that had
worked so well against the African American Other, a separate but
equal paradigm that prevented the Other from attaining and
exercising "too much" political power in civil society.
The reasoning that underlies the two separatist regimes is
almost identical. The Enlightenment view of religion, forcefully
articulated by Thomas Paine (and inherent in Jefferson's wall metaphor), characterizes religious individuals as "mythologists" who are
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unwilling to be guided by reason, and who create absurd and
extravagant fables to terrify and enslave mankind. Fear of the nonconformity of the religious caused Jefferson and his fellow deists to
advocate separate spheres of operation for the secular and the sectarian and to argue that the sectarian sphere must be set apart from
wider society as a safety measure. To the deists, the superiority of
reason over revelation was as natural as the superiority of Whites
over Blacks, leaving no room for civil and political equality between
the secular and the sectarian. Thus, under the wall metaphor and
similar doctrines, arguments that there is injustice and unfairness in
limiting the civil and political access rights of religious individuals
in order to maintain the existing social order are incoherent.
Moreover, as with racial segregation, the continuing appeal
and longevity of religious segregation lies in the emphasis it places
on "equality" for religious people in their sphere. Outside of their
sphere, however, religious individuals, like African Americans in
the Jim Crow era, are viewed as a threat to liberty and democracy. 16
Thus, unlike Madison's comments during the debates, which
focused on not coercing people into religious observance, the wall
metaphor focuses on controlling or eliminating the political power
of religious people. It met the need of the political momentcontrolling the growing power of a religious Other-in a way more
egalitarian doctrines did not.
The 1948 McCollum decision seems to demonstrate the
existence of a segregationist philosophy at the core of the Court's
wall metaphor. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that, "both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."" The
15 See THOMAS PAINE, AGE OF REASON 1 (1974).

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814) ("In every
country and in every age, the priest has been hostile to liberty. He is always in
alliance with the Despot, abetting his abuses in return for protection to his own.");
Everson, 330 U.S. at 53-54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that allowing
religious groups to fight for a share of government assistance or aid will "destroy
the cherished liberty").
17 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
" Id. at 212.
16
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Court held that allowing religious teachers to enter the public school
and provide the option of religious instruction to students during the
school day was unconstitutional. 19 It appeared to believe that religious instruction in the public school, no matter how voluntary, was
presumptively unconstitutional because it allowed religion to escape
its "proper" sphere. On the other hand, the Supreme Court later validated a similar program in which religious students were dismissed
from the public school to go to separate schools for religious
instruction. 20 Though the use of the taxpayer's "three pence" was
held unconstitutional when the government sought to accommodate
religious parents within the same sphere that it accommodated all
other parents, such use was constitutional when it supported religious parents and their children in their segregated spaces.
In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter deployed another
staple of segregationist ideology-segregation produces social harmony.21 Justice Frankfurter began by noting that permitting religious instruction in schools causes children to be sharply conscious
of religious differences,22 and that awareness of these differences
inevitably results in divisiveness. This allowed him to conclude that,
because divisiveness is contrary to the spirit of community the common school is designed to foster, religious segregation is essential to
a school's mission.23 To Frankfurter, the mere acknowledgement of
difference is divisive, and one builds community best by masking
difference or excluding those whose differences cannot be masked.
By this reasoning, the best way to foster racial peace and tolerance is
by educating African-Americans in separate schools set apart from
White Americans, and the best way to foster religious freedom and
tolerance is by educating deeply religious students in isolated
habitats separate from secular students.
2190 Id.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
21 See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 228 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22 See id. ("As a result, the public school system of Champaign
actively furthers
inculcation in the religious tenets of some faiths, and in the process sharpens the
consciousness of religious differences at least among some of the children
committed to its care.").
23

See id.
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Of course, the 1950s and 60s revealed that, not only did
segregation not promote racial tolerance and a sense of community,
it somehow managed to foster truly frightening levels of bigotry,
intolerance and inequality. Watching children mauled by dogs and
gunfights on university campuses challenged the smug American
assumption that "E pluribus unum" was a simple matter of ignoring
and excluding those who were non-conforming. Violence and
bloodshed cast the principle of racial segregation into doubtthough it did not completely eliminate the practices. 24 There have,
however, been no similar levels of violence or bloodshed resulting
from religious segregation, and the judiciary has continued to support such segregation as an equitable and legitimate constitutional
principle.
When one confronts the reality that religion is a comprehensive explanation of the thoughts and actions of a community,
continued adherence to religious segregation and its "no aid" rule
becomes very difficult to justify as consistent with modem ideals of
equality. One cannot deny aid to a religion anymore than one can
deny aid to an explanation. One can only deny aid to the people
whose thoughts and actions are explained by a particular religious
doctrine. Thus, one cannot deny aid to Catholicism; one can only
deny aid to Catholics acting in a way Catholicism explains. This
creates an inverse relationship between the exercise of religion and
equal treatment. The more actions a person takes that can be
explained by their religious beliefs, the more discriminatory "denials
of aid" the Constitution will countenance against them. Thus, a
person whose religious beliefs only account for how s/he spends her
Sunday or Saturday morning, will encounter much less state
sanctioned discrimination than a person with a more comprehensive
religion doctrine that explains the school her children attend, how she
votes, the civil policies she supports, where she works, and whom
she marries. This dynamic seems to turn the religious clauses on their
heads by penalizing rather than guaranteeing the free exercise of
24 See generally PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISES
OF
THE BROWN DECISION (2004) (discussing the widespread persistence of de facto

school segregation post-Brown).
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religion. Though Justice Black tried to define religion in Everson as
meaning religious institutions but not religious individuals,2 5 the
dissent (and subsequent majority) describes discrimination against
religious individuals as the constitutional "price" of their free
exercise rights 26
2 apparently seeing no contradiction in a constitution's guaranteeing "free" exercise in one clause, only to exact a
price for that exercise of religion in the very next clause.
Moreover, embedded in expressions like "separate but
equal" and "separation of church and state" are presuppositions
about who has the power to separate and who deserves to be separated. The racial segregation paradigm assumes that White people
alone, not a unified citizenry, are the best judges of what is best for a
society that includes both Black people and White people. Similarly,
the religious segregation paradigm assumes that secular people
alone, not a unified citizenry, are the best judges of what is best for a
society that includes both secular and religious people. In addition,
just as the racial segregation paradigm presupposes that having
black skin justifies segregation in a way that having blue eyes or red
hair does not, so too, the religious segregation paradigm presupposes that a belief in theology justifies political segregation in ways
that beliefs in anarchy or communism do not.
The doctrine of "separation of church and state," like its
parent "separate but equal," is a doctrine that presupposes the legitimate and non-discriminatory nature of state mandated segregation.
That assumption has no place in a post-Brown world, in which
segregation is the touchstone of illegitimacy and discrimination.
Thus, the Court's attempts to use a doctrine that presupposes the
legitimacy of religious discrimination has only produced doctrinal
incoherence. Audre Lorde described this phenomenon as using the
25

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (finding that while New Jersey

cannot "contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church", it also "cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion").
26 Id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Religious liberty with a great price must be
bought. And for those who exercise it most fully, by insisting upon religious
education for their children mixed with secular, by the terms of our Constitution
the price is greater than for others.").
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master's tool to tear down the master's house; 27 one cannot use tools
that presuppose outcomes fundamentally at odds with one's goals
and expect to achieve those goals. It is simply not possible to use a
doctrine that presupposes the inequality and inferiority of religious
identity to secure equality and neutral treatment of religious identity.
This is why almost the only times the Court has been able to avoid
discriminating against religious individuals under its current doctrine has been when it abandoned the Establishment Clause completely and characterized the issue as one of freedom of speech or
association 28 rather than of religion. Unfortunately, the peculiar
persistence of religious discrimination under its "religiously neutral"
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not led the Court to reexamine its tools; it has only led it to describe them differently.
C.

The Lemon Test

In 1963, segregation was a beleaguered practice as the Civil
Rights Movement spread across the South and highlighted the
unequal distributions of power inherent in the right of White people
to exclude Black people. Perhaps not by chance, the Supreme Court
in the same year began to emphasize neutrality more than segregation in its interpretations of the Establishment Clause. Thus, in
Abington v. Schempp, the Court distilled the reasoning of all of its
previous cases into a constitutional requirement of "wholesome
neutrality."29 However, as a practical matter, there is little difference
between separate but neutral and separate but equal. The test of
"wholesome neutrality" was whether the legislation had "a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advance[d] nor
27

Andre Lourde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in

112 (1984).
See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (granting religious groups equal access to school property under the
viewpoint neutrality requirements of the free speech clause); Rosenberger v.
Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (requiring funding of religious
student journal on same terms as secular student journals as a matter of viewpoint
neutrality under the Free Speech Clause).
29 Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
221 (1963).
SISTER OUTSIDER 110,
28
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,,30
inhibit[ed] religion.'0
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,31 the Court further
refined its definition of wholesome neutrality by adding that neutral
laws must not promote "excessive" government involvement with
religion. 32 These three prongs-all laws must have a secular
legislative purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and must not promote "excessive" government
involvement with religion3 3 -became known as the Lemon test.
The Lemon test's "wholesome neutrality" repeats the conceptual flaw inherent in the wall metaphor by assuming that "religion" is somehow separate and distinct from religious people, rather
than a comprehensive explanation of their actions. When one realizes that religion is a fundamental characteristic of religious people,
and not a separate thing in itself, the flaw in this articulation is readily apparent. Under the Lemon test, laws must not reflect the purposes of religious people, must not advance the interests of religious
people, and must not promote "excessive" government involvement
with religious people. When one substitutes other fundamental characteristics for religion, the incompatibility of "wholesome neutrality" and representative democracy is underscored. Wholesome racial
neutrality would prohibit all laws whose purpose or effect is
improvement in the welfare of racial minorities or that require
legislators to become too entangled in the affairs of racial minority
groups. Similarly, wholesome gender neutrality would require
voiding all laws that reflect the purposes of American women, that
advance the interests of American women, or that "entangle" representatives in the interests and affairs of their female constituents.
How can the Constitution be read to permit, must less
require, wholesale denials of representation? If the people are the
sovereign, then the government that represents them cannot be
wholly secular without denying membership in the sovereign to
religious people. Denial or suppression of one's religious identity is
not a proper precondition of democratic participation or representation; in a republic, the government has taken an oath to represent the
30

Id. at 222.

32

U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13.

33

Id.

1 403
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interests of all people, this includes religious people, as well as
Black people and female people. Interpreting wholesome constitutional "neutrality" as denying representation to select groups betrays
our constitutional commitment to equality in an egregious manner.
Under the Lemon test, any and every group of citizens may
successfully lobby their government for enhanced protection of their
interests, a greater share of community resources devoted to the
causes they value, and improved opportunities for their members,
except citizens and groups whose values and interests are religious
in nature. Religious people cannot benefit from laws passed by their
representatives if the benefit is desired because of their religious
beliefs or if the interests they support can be explained by a religious
creed. Like the wall metaphor, the Lemon test relegates religious
people and their interests to the fringes of the republic, limited to the
crumbs of representation that flow from the occasional confluence
of religious and non-religious interests.
In the Lemon analysis, representation of religious adherents
as religious adherents is proscribed as an advancement of religion.
On the other hand, representation of women as women and of Black
people as Black people is considered the advancement of representative democracy. However, unlike African Americans and women,
from the very founding of this country, the Constitution's "We the
People" included those whose social and political actions were
guided and accounted for by their religious beliefs. The citizenry
that voted to ratify the Constitution was not wholly secular. Thus, it
proves too much to argue that the representative government they
created was designed around a secular bias that required the govemment to ignore the values and interests of the very people who
created it. Neither the make-up of "We the People" then, nor the
make-up of "We the People" now can justify a reading of the
Establishment Clause that conditions the representation of religious
adherents on their ability to create secular pretexts for their values
and interests. If my representation in government is conditioned on
my espousing the values and interests of someone else, I, myself,
have no representation. Indeed, such surrogacy seems to violate
every principle of freedom of speech and of equal protection modem
courts have come to recognize.
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Unfortunately, modem courts have justified this constitutional anomaly by suggesting that the founders in their great and
unchallengeable wisdom believed that religious segregation was
necessary for the creation and preservation of American democracy,
and so it must be. 34 The founding generation also believed that
slavery, patriarchy, and the extermination of Native Americans were
necessary for the creation and preservation of American democracy-for some, that might warrant taking their assertions of the
need for even more discrimination with a grain of salt. Moreover,
under modem Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, we have
largely managed to outgrow the racist, sexist, and nativist inclinations of the founding generation. Somehow, however, religious
discrimination continues to thrive, not merely against religious sects
or the irreligious, but most strongly against those individuals perceived as taking their religion "too seriously."3s For the latter group,
the Constitution provides no remedy, and, instead, places its blessing on their marginalization. How has religious identity, the only
identity specifically protected in the Bill of Rights, managed to be
the only identity still confined to the back of the bus?
D.

The Endorsement Test

In the 1980's, as the "religious right" succeeded in building a
political coalition around allegations that Supreme Court precedents
discriminated against religious individuals and abridged religious
freedoms, 36 the Court made yet another attempt to define religious
segregation as religious neutrality. In a concurring opinion in Lynch
v. Donnelly (which later became the Court majority's approach),
Justice O'Connor created the endorsement test. It defined establishment as "making adherence to religion relevant in any way to a

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (purporting to the interpret the
clause as Jefferson intended); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212
(1948) (finding the same).
35 See supra PartII.B.
36 DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD'S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 149 (Kindle ed., 2012).
34
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person's standing in the political community."37 While this sounds
like an end to government sanctioned segregation and denials of
representation, in practice, it devolved into a continuation of those
very things. A right is no more extensive than its remedy, and the
neutrality right Justice O'Conner so skillfully articulated was not
remedied by the foreclosure of religious discrimination in general,
but only by foreclosure of the subjective injury of "government
approval of religious beliefs." As a matter of internal consistency,
if it is the religious nature of a person's beliefs that gives nonadherents a roving right of enforcement against her whenever she
appears to receive government approval, then her religious identity
is always relevant to her standing in the political community, for it is
always relevant in determining whether the government has a duty
to suppress approval of her beliefs. If she holds no beliefs of a religious nature, the government has no such duty in relation to her. The
"neutrality" of a right designed to prevent the government from
"making adherence to religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community,"39 which places duties on the
government only with respect to individuals and groups with religious affiliations is purely chimerical.
This fallacy is compounded by the asymmetrical nature of
enforcement. According to the Lynch concurrence, endorsement
"sends a message to nonadherents of religion that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents of religion that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." 40 Similarly, according to the
concurrence, disapproval sends the "opposite message," presumably
to religious adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to non-adherents of religion, that they are insiders, favored members of the

37

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

See id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Government practices that purport to
celebrate or acknowledge events with religious significance must be subjected to
careful judicial scrutiny.").
39
Id. at 687.
40 Id. at 688.
38
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political community.4 1 While this formulation is facially neutral, the
Court is not seriously suggesting that witches and broomsticks are
now constitutionally barred from public displays during Halloween
because they send messages of exclusion to those who associate
such symbols with evil or with Wiccan ideologies. Enforcement
runs only against the symbols of traditional religions and religious
groups. As a result, the endorsement test is non-neutral in application and fails to account for the psychic harms attendant upon
judicial invalidation of displays only when those displays purport to
respond to the values and interests of religious citizens, as they are
the only group required by law to stay in their closets and out of
publicly owned spaces.
Scholars such as Eisgruber and Sager argue that the removal
of displays from the public square can never "disparage" or psychically harm religious adherents in any way comparable to the harm
done to the areligious. Using social meaning as a framework, they
argue that "it would be bizarre to say that the social meaning of
taking the [symbol] down is that mainstream Christians are not full
and respected members of the community." 42 Instead, they suggest
that the alleged harm of removal lies in denying mainstream Christians an entitlement to have the government validate their specialness. This argument, must fail. First, it is far from clear that there is
one identifiable "social" meaning or consensus on religious symbols
and their removal. More to the point, when some citizens are singled
out and required to forfeit all gains in the political process merely
because the interests for which they successfully lobbied are rooted
in and reflect their religious values, it is not an issue of specialness.
It is an issue of religious groups being deprived of political gains
and benefits secular groups would have been entitled to retain.
Despite what Eisgruber and Sager imply, majorities in a
democracy actually are entitled to assert the right to "recognize
what [they] have in common and to take pride in what makes [them]
special.
Democracies normally make laws centered on majoritar41
See id.
42
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
THE CONSTITUTION
43

1Id. at

130.

129 (2007).
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ian values and commemorate those occasions in which the majority
of the people take pride or joy. This is why some communities
celebrate Hispanic History Month, Native American Day, and
Juneteenth, while others do not. The freedom to make such choices
is what democratic rule generally means, and it is normally only
limited by equal protection principles. However, when the democratic majority wishes to show respect to religious values, there are
additional, special, vague, judicially created limitations. As a result,
any "social" meaning of display removal cannot be merely, "Religious majorities are not more special than everyone else." It must
also reflect the belief that religious majorities alone, and thus the
religious citizens that comprise those majorities, are the only ones
who cannot be trusted with the expressive rights and powers that
normally attend democratic governance. Singling out associations of
people with religious identities as uniquely more dangerous to
democracy than all other associations seems quite inconsistent with
"the requirement of ... 'equal regard' that lies at the heart of the

Establishment Clause."44 Ultimately, suggesting that the Constitution mandates discrimination against religious people because they
are more dangerous to democracy than any other group is not to
offer a neutral basis of decision, but rather to offer a justification for
abandoning neutrality in favor of segregation. Unless one "acquires
a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long
use," 45 the practices of religious discrimination and segregation need
to be reconsidered in light of modern understandings of equality and
neutrality.
III.

NEUTRALITIES AND RELIGIONS
A.

The Creation of Two Neutralities

The Court's speech and display cases have created two competing definitions of neutrality, one requiring equality and the other
requiring inequality. In religious speech cases, the Court defines
44

Id. at 126.

45

Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
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neutrality as requiring equal access for both religious and secular
identities. Thus, if a school or university provides access to its facilities for secular viewpoints and groups, it must also provide the same
access to religious viewpoints and groups. 46 Under this interpretation, the Establishment Clause is not a license to discriminate
against religious identity; instead, such discrimination violates constitutional principles of neutrality.47
In religious display cases, on the other hand, the Court
defines religious neutrality as consistent with according unequal
levels of access to religious and secular identities. Thus, in the City
ofAllegheny County v. A. C.L. U., the Court relied on the principle of

neutrality in barring government displays that celebrate the religious
aspects of holidays that have both secular and religious components. 48 The Court rejected the argument that neutrality means that
the right to acknowledge religious aspects of dual holidays is coextensive with the right to acknowledge secular aspects of the same
holidays. Instead, the Court found that there is a constitutional mandate "that the government remain secular, rather than affiliate itself
with religious beliefs or institutions." 49 Under this rule, religious
symbols are denied the equal protection afforded to religious
See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (finding unconstitutional discrimination when school facilities were made available for use by all
student groups, except religious student groups); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (finding unconstitutional
discrimination in a policy that allowed school property to be used for family
values presentations from secular viewpoints, but not religious viewpoints);
Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (finding
unconstitutional discrimination in a university policy that provided funds for the
publication of secular student journals but denied funding to religiously oriented
student journals).
47 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (1993) (rejecting the school's Establishment
Clause defense as a justification for the exclusion of all religions and uses for
religious purposes).
48 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573, 611-12 (1989) (noting that
"confining the government's own celebration of Christmas to the holiday's secular
aspects does not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of
Christians. Rather, it simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday
without expressing an allegiance to Christian beliefs.) (emphasis in original).
49
Id. at 610.
46
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viewpoints and expression,5 0 though it is far from clear that religious
symbols are truly distinguishable from the latter.
If neutrality means something other than disenfranchisement, the focus of the Establishment Clause cannot be the viewpoint
endorsement that invariably attends majority rule, but rather must be
on discrimination that invades minority rights and on the neutral
treatment of religious identity. In other words, democracy and equality cannot be squared with a constitutional mandate that the government can never represent religious people. Rather, a neutral interpretation of the clauses lies in diversity, not secularity, namely that
the government cannot only represent religious people. There is an
entire constitution between only and never that the Court has so far
disregarded.
Moreover, in order to effectively adjudicate religious cases,
the Court must recognize that the privileging of secular identities
does not occur in a vacuum, but inevitably places non-reciprocal
duties on those individuals who have chosen to embrace religious
identities instead of secular ones. The Court cannot allocate different
levels of rights and burdens based on identity without acknowledging that it is purposefully assigning different values to the conflicting interests in community disputes. Moreover, using the principle of neutrality as a mask for the enforcement of its secular
objectives only serves to destabilize the Court's jurisprudence while
failing to establish the legitimacy of the underlying principle of
secularity through segregation.51
See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (striking
down the use of crosses to memorialize dead highway patrol officers regardless of
the officers' religious affiliations).
5 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (finding that there is no
constitutional requirement that the government prefer those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe, nor any requirement that the government
"throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious
influence"). See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (casting doubt
on the principle of secularity by noting that "invok[ing] [d]ivine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws" does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-90 (2005) (affirming that whatever else the Establishment Clause may prevent, it does not prevent government
acknowledgment of the nation's religious heritage).
50
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Is Religion a Belief or the Role of a Belief
System?

A related source of tension in religious equality jurisprudence lies in the fact that "religion" as used in the non-Establishment context appears to mean something different from "religion"
as used in the Free-Exercise context, causing religious equality to
place conflicting demands on the government under the free exercise and non-establishment doctrines. For example, in the Establishment Clause context, religion is defined by the content of beliefs,
and secularity is viewed as neutral because it does not take a
position on the truth or falsity of religious doctrines. Under the Free
Exercise Clause, however, religion is not defined in terms of belief
or doctrine, but rather in terms of the role a doctrine or belief system
plays in a person's life. Thus, the question the Court asks under the
Free Exercise Clause is "whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessorparallelto
thatfilled by orthodox belief in God."52 For some people, a belief in
God is central to their understanding of and engagement with the
world, their perceptions of themselves and others, and their evaluation of good and evil. For others, a belief in enlightenment,53
rebirth,54 or the perfection of the soul through non-violencess is
central to their understanding of and engagement with the world,
their perceptions of themselves and others, and their evaluation of
good and evil. The last examples, though atheistic, are considered
religions under the Supreme Court's definition because the nondeistic belief systems they embody function as an external source of
moral values that influence life choices to the same extent as value
systems rooted in theology. Though secularity does not take a stance
on the content of belief, it does take a stance on the role of religion
52

U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).

66 (Richard S. Ellwood & Gregory
D. Alles, eds., 2007) (noting that the focus of Buddhism is following the path to
enlightenment, not the worship of gods).
54 Id. at 200 (noting that Hindus may be polytheistic, monotheistic or atheist, but
share a common belief in the centrality of rebirth).
5 Id. at 229 (noting that non-injury is the cardinal rule of Jainism).
53 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONs
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in a person's life, and seems to mandate a single, private role for
religious belief for the entire nation.
However, if the role assigned to religious belief is as much a
part of religion as the content of belief, as the Supreme Court's
broad definition of religion suggests, then the orthodoxy of secularity and its prescription of a single "proper" role for religion should
present an establishment problem. In the Establishment Clause
context, however, the Court has consistently obsessed over govemmental ratification of specific doctrines as true, while at the same
time, ignoring equally problematic governmental messages about
the proper role of external moral codes and the proper degree of
reliance on them. This results in doctrines under which those with a
"proper" view of the role of religion-as a private individual affair
that plays no role in social or public life-are full members of the
political community, while those with an "improper" view of the
role of religion-as communal, interpersonal, and central to both
their private decisions and civic engagement-are deprived of the
right to engage in civil society on equal terms, and are denied the
right to use the democratic process to obtain concessions and protections from the government. It can be argued that current Establishment Clause doctrine, while attempting to be neutral in terms of the
content of beliefs, unabashedly provides different levels of rights
and privileges to citizens according to the role they assign to their
beliefs-with greater political access afforded to those who assign
more nominal public roles to their religious beliefs.
Discriminating against people according to the role they
assign to their religious beliefs-and thus the way they practice their
religion-would seem to be discrimination in the exercise of a fundamental right, justifiable only if required by a compelling interest.
Is the government's interest in secularity a compelling one?
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SECULAR SUPREMACY AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A.

The Rights of Racial and Non-Religious
Minorities

Obviously, protecting a pre-existing constitutional right is a
compelling interest. The question is, what right does the principle of
secularity protect? At its most basic level, it seems to be the right not
to feel like a religious minority or outsider.56 This raises the question
of whether there is a corresponding right not to be made to feel like
a racial minority or outsider. For, if a right not to be made to feel
like a minority exists in the interstices of the Constitution, one
would think that a group that had been subjected to slavery,
kidnapping, rape, and torture would have first claim to its remedy.
Yet, Brown v. Board of Education, arguably the Supreme Court case

most solicitous to feelings of subordination, limited itself to laws
that mandated racial segregation and did not address the pervasive
yet amorphous system of white supremacy that infested the social
practices of its day and positioned African Americans as eternal
"Others" distinct from the American polity.57 Moreover, after
Washington v. Davis, racial minorities are protected only from
actual and intentional discrimination. Nonreligious minorities, on
the other hand, continue to be protected from psychic feelings of
outsiderness. This means that the principle of racial equality
enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide constituSee Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting that the Establishment
Clause is violated under the endorsement test when the government sends a
message to non-adherents that they are "outsiders, not full members of the political
community").
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding only "that in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place").
5 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (finding that a statute that is
"more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white" is nevertheless constitutional, so long as its purpose is neutral and there
was no intentional discrimination). Under this theory, the real and psychic harms
to the African-Americans so burdened are constitutionally insignificant.
56
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tional protection against the psychic harms of white supremacy, but
the principle of secularity, "enshrined" in an informal personal
letter, 59 does provide constitutional protection against the psychic
harms of theology. The extent of this asymmetry seems to call for an
explanation. Why is being made to feel like a nonreligious minority
so much more constitutionally suspect than being made to feel like a
racial minority? Such clarity is especially needed given that the
racial minorities denied protection in the first instance are also more
likely to be members of the religious majorities denied democratic
gains in the second instance. 60 When Supreme Court jurisprudence
creates a situation in which groups who completely lack representation on the Court (poor minorities) are always the losers in constitutional adjudication, it is time to consider whether the result is
conscious constitutionalism or subconscious classism.
Secondly, one could concede that the Court's passive display
cases are protecting more than the right not to feel like a nonreligious minority and still not establish that these cases are
protecting a right so inherent in the "concept of ordered liberty" that
- -61it must be inferred where it is not explicitly stated. There is certainly no clear historic right to secular public spaces traceable to the
founding era.62 Nor can the "secular liberty" protected in the passive
59 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in MICHAEL W. McCONNELL, JOHN H.
GARVEY, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 44 (3rd ed.

2011) (advocating a wall of separation between church and state-a metaphor that
has historically been used to justify the doctrine of secular supremacy).
60 Michelle A. Vu, African-Americans Most Religiously Devout Group, THE
CHRISTIAN POST, Feb. 2, 2009, at
1-5, available at http://www.

christianpost.com/news/african-americans-most-religiously-devout-group-36736/
(discussing findings that African-Americans are the most religiously devout group
in America, followed closely by Latinos).
61See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that the central due process question is whether an act or statute "violates
basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
62 Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court Is Wrong about the
Establishment Clause, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 224 (2001) (agreeing with

Professor Laurence Tribe's conclusion that there were at least three distinct
approaches to the religious clauses among the framers-those seeking to protect
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display cases be justified as similar to the rights of privacy and
personal autonomy recognized, however controversially, in Roe v.
Wade63 and Lawrence v. Texas.64 The passive display cases are not
about preventing government interference with private choices, but
rather about enforcing governmental discrimination against religious
viewpoints. Historically, viewpoint censorship has been considered
anathema to, rather than inherent in, constitutional protections of
liberty, especially religious liberty. 65
If anything, the Court's passive display precedents raise the
specter of Romer v. Evans.66 There, a state constitutional amendment denied gays the right to ever seek or obtain government
recognition as a protected group.67 The Supreme Court found this to
be a clear and unequivocal violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 It held that "a law declaring that, in general, it shall be more
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in
the most literal sense."69 Nevertheless, in its Religion Clause cases,
the Supreme Court has adopted the very same approach by effectively establishing as a matter of federal constitutional law that no
religious group may seek or obtain government recognition as a
protected group. Protection of religious interests and improvement
in the standing of religious individuals are both eternally damned
religion, those seeking to protect government, or/and those seeking to place
religion on the same level as other "factions"), with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 92-103 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "wall of separation
between church and state" analogy is historically unfounded and a corruption of
the meaning of the Establishment Clause).
63 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a right to abortion in the name of
privacy and autonomy).
64 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down laws criminalizing
homosexual conduct as violations of privacy rights).
65 See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (noting
that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination" that is forbidden even when the government has created a limited public
forum).
66 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
67 Id. at 624.
68
69

Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
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under the Establishment Clause because government affiliation with
the efforts of religious individuals is a proscribed affiliation with
religion. 70 Thus, what Romer harshly criticized as an irrational fear
of homosexuals in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment has
become, under the endorsement test, a quite rational, justified and
constitutionallymandated fear of religious believers.7 1
It is beyond ironic that the amendment designed to protect
religious believers from discrimination has instead become a command to discriminate against religious identities. 72 This shift
occurred because the segregationist impulses animating both the
endorsement test and the Lemon test construe the religion clauses as
guaranteeing freedom from religion (by their emphasis on secular
purpose) rather than freedom of religion. This transforms constitutional protection of religious identity into a bias in favor of secular
identity. The first step away from religious segregation is the same
one that pointed away from racial segregation, recognition that
neutral and equal treatment under the laws is incompatible with
segregation in any form.
B.

Equal Protection Must Trump Secularity

[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution ... neither knows nor tolerates classes among

citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (interpreting the wall
metaphor to mean that the government violates the Establishment Clause if its
laws result in aid to religion, however indirectly, or when it promotes religious
interests).
71 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) ("Ordinarily, political debate
and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect.... The potential divisiveness of such conflict
is a threat to the normal political process.").
70

72

See id.
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equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful. The law regards man as man. 73
This was not true in 1896, and it is still not true today. But
we can make it more true by abandoning segregation as a control
mechanism for the religious and having more faith in the democratic
process. Though Establishment Clause jurisprudence has become
hopelessly bogged down over equality of beliefs, the Fourteenth
Amendment has historically attempted to ensure equal treatment
among persons with different social identities. At the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the idea that people should not be treated
differently because of their race or ethnicity. Race and ethnicity are
markers of personhood and emblems of "otherness" that have long
invited public and private discrimination, and religious identity has
historically functioned in a similar way.
Thus, incorporation of the Religion Clauses should not be
read as transforming the Fourteenth Amendment's concern with
identity into a concern for beliefs, whether expressed publicly or
privately. Instead, incorporation of the religion clauses into the
Fourteenth Amendment should be construed as expanding the protection of identities to include the identity that was first in the mind
of the founding generation-religious identity. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment prevents racial minorities from being relegated
to a separate class governed by separate rules, so, too, it should
prevent individuals with religious identities from being relegated to
a separate class subject to separate rules. It makes no sense to insist
that discrimination violates the Constitution when there is intent to
treat people differently based on their racial identity, but not when
there is intent to treat people differently based on their religious
identity. When the benefits of democracy cease to flow from votes
and citizenship and instead are made to rest on personal characteristics such as race and degree of religiosity, the Court embraces
the founder's weaknesses rather than building on their strengths.
Moreover, as a matter of history and practice, the ideology
of white supremacy has led to more oppression, persecution and
73

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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murder in this country than any variation of theology. Yet, racial
minorities have only the Fourteenth Amendment to protect them
should future White majorities decide again to run amok in the
fields of genocide and racial oppression. If the Fourteenth Amendment is good enough for racial minorities, whose persecution by
white supremacist governments ended only a few decades ago, why
is it not sufficient protection for non-religious minorities whose
persecutions by government ended centuries ago, if comparable
persecution ever occurred at all? It is only the Court's continued use
of the flawed tools of the founding generation that makes it more
solicitous of the rights of non-religious minorities than of the racial
and ethnic minorities who have yet to recover from the effects of
concentrated government persecution. After all, the men who wrote
the religion clauses were non-religious minorities, not racial or
ethnic minorities.
What is the alternative? Though the racial analogy highlights
the flaws of our current jurisprudence, it is gender jurisprudence that
provides an alternative method of adjudication. In gender equality
cases, the Fourteenth Amendment sometimes requires that women
be treated differently from men, and, other times, it requires men
and women to be treated identically. This variability springs from
the fact that there are real biological differences between men and
women, as well as genuine social differences in terms of the extent
of their victimization by other members of society. Gender equality
cases thus require judicial determinations of just what difference
these differences make in treatment before the law, and reflect a
recognition of the fact that the existence of difference precludes a
blanket rule of identical treatment.
A similar variableness can be found in our Religion Clause
jurisprudence. Sometimes having a religious identity is treated
differently than not having a religious identity, and at other times,
the two are treated the same. 74 Though the Court has offered no
Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 706 (2012) (recognizing a ministerial exception to federal discrimination
laws), with Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 87879 (1990) (noting that free exercise does not mean "that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
74
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coherent rationale for its shifts between these two positions, this
article suggests that implicit in these shifts are recognitions and
denials of differences in volition. The law has long recognized that
there is a significant difference between individuals who embark
upon a course of action purely as a result of internal processes, and
individuals who are constrained by externalities to embark upon that
same course of action. The existence of external influence, and thus
differences in volition between the religious and non-religious, has
historically been construed as the source of difference in the religion
context. Thus, one of the earliest rationales for religious freedom
was the belief that democratic governments should not force individuals to choose between losing their soul and obeying the law. In
modem times, however, the existence of God, and even souls, has
become highly contested.
For example, religious individuals often believe that submission to external entities or codes is essential for their soul's survival.
As a result, they interpret religious freedom to mean that actions
taken to preserve their soul from destruction will be treated as
solicitously (if not more solicitously) under the law as actions taken
to preserve their lives. Secular and non-religious individuals, however, tend to deny the existence of external threats to the soul and
often view religion as a form of self-fulfillment and self-actualization that is indistinguishable from non-religious attempts to live and
enjoy life on one's own terms. This view informs their belief that the
religious are the same as the non-religious and are not entitled to
more solicitous treatment.
These two extremes present a difficulty for the courts,
because the government is required to be neutral on the issue of
higher powers and external moral codes. This means that the
government can neither confirm nor deny whether a person's soul is
at stake when they are forced to choose between the laws and their
religion. This is often, erroneously, interpreted as ignoring this
dilemma and conducting government as if God and souls do not
exist. In reality, it requires remaining open to the possibility that the
religious should be treated the same as the non-religious without
conduct that the State is free to regulate").
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foreclosing the possibility of treating the two differently. While the
government cannot definitively say, "Yes, your soul is truly at
stake," it also cannot definitively say, "No, your soul is not at stake."
Instead, in passing laws that touch upon religion, the government
must weigh the harms that would result if each were false and try to
choose the path that would result in the least harm to society and the
one most likely to contribute to the creation of a society in which all
citizens have equal access to the benefits of participatory democracy, regardless of their religious identity. When these two considerations pull in opposite directions, the government should
prioritize the latter.
It is in this respect that an analogy to gender can be most
instructive, for differential treatment of the genders is not an always
or never proposition; instead, it is contingent and deliberative.
Moreover, where differential treatment is allowed, it is informed by
history and thus is always designed to equalize the opportunities of
women in society or remove barriers to their participation, but never
to enforce their exclusion. Our gender equality jurisprudence does
not allow the government to limit the civil and political gains of
women as a group as the "price" of those laws that specifically protect women from victimization. More importantly, in distinguishing
between differences that do and do not matter in the gender context,
the Court has adopted an anti-stereotype principle. It has struck
down laws that incorporate stereotypes concerning the proper role of
women in society," despite the fact that these stereotypes were held
by a majority of the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause.
The same approach could be and should be used to improve
our religious equality jurisprudence. Religious equality should never
function as a pretext to marginalize the religious in the secular
sphere or exclude the religious from full democratic participation.
Moreover, the denial of the civil and political gains of religious
individuals should never be justified as the "price" of the protection

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (noting that "generalizations
about 'the way women are' [and] estimates of what is appropriate for most
women" do not justify discrimination against women who do not fit these
stereotypes).
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of religious liberty.76 More importantly, the Court must adopt an
anti-stereotyping principle in the context of religious identity,
striking down laws that incorporate negative stereotypes about
religious identity or the proper role of religion in public life, regardless of the misconceptions of the framers. This would be far truer to
the ideals of religious freedom and equality than the current system
that practically requires laws to incorporate stereotypical fears of
religious tyranny77 and elitist generalizations about the proper role
of religion in public life.78 True neutrality between religion and nonreligion requires a presumption of equal treatment coupled with a
judicious weighing of the costs and benefits of treating religious
people the same as non-religious people in situations in which they
may, in fact, be quite different.
It is thus past time to recognize that fidelity to the Constitution does not require the Court to adopt the prejudices of the founders as legal principles; the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
replace such prejudice with equality and to ensure that differences in
religious identity would not be a basis for discriminatory treatment. 79 Reviving this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment

See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(stating that "religious liberty with a great price must be bought. And for those
who exercise it most fully, by insisting upon religious education for their children
mixed with secular, by the terms of our Constitution the price is greater than for
others.").
77 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (positioning religion as uniquely threatening to the
political process).
78 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding
that the only acceptable constitutional role of religion in public life is that of
"ceremonial deism," where references to God have lost "any significant religious
content" through rote repetition); accordCnty. of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S.
573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (while declining to formally
address the status of religious identity under the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection clause, the Court noted that a longstanding principle of its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that "no State may 'exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation"' (quoting Everson,
76
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would allow a government to represent the values and interests of
both secular and religious majorities, while also ensuring that both
were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religious
identity. In such a regime, the protection of minority religious identities and secular identities would lie, not in the piecemeal abrogation of the rights and political gains of successful religious
coalitions, but in the equal protection principles of the Constitution.
If the Equal Protection Clause indeed stands as a bulwark against
tyranny, nothing else is required, for it cannot be the case that the
guarantee of equal protection is enough to prevent tyranny by all
majority groups except those comprised of religious coalitions.
Moreover, as the Court has repeatedly denied any intent to treat
religion less favorably than non-religion,so Equal Protection analysis
is an appropriate way to reconcile the Court's actions with its
rhetoric.
V.

APPLYING THE EQUAL PROTECTION TEST
TO PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS

Application of the Equal Protection analysis to passive
display cases would begin the way all equal protection analyses
begin, by evaluating whether there has been differential treatment of
similarly situated individuals on the basis of a proscribed classification, in this instance, religious identity. A key question would be
whether a state's action in displaying the creche (or the Ten Commandments) imposes different benefits and burdens upon citizens
depending upon their religious identity. In the passive display context, the answer to this first question must always be "no," because
of the psychic nature of the harm.
330 U.S. at 16), which is a clear articulation of a non-discrimination principle
based on religious identity as inherent in the Establishment Clause).
so See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (noting that the Establishment Clause is violated
under the endorsement test when the government sends a message to adherents
that they are "outsiders, not full members of the political community"). See also
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683-84 (2005) (denying that the Establishment
Clause requires the government to "evince a hostility to religion by disabling the
government from ... recognizing our religious heritage").
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The psychic nature of the harm means that the constitutional
violation lies not in differences in an individual's treatment, but in
an individual's response to the display's "message." As such, a
psychic equal protection violation on the basis of religion must rest
on the assumption that all Jews have the same subjective response to
the displays, as do all Christians, as do all atheists, as do all Catholics. For, to win an equal protection claim, one must show that all
other things being equal, had this one aspect of identity been
different, the benefit or burden would have been different. Thus, all
else being equal, had this individual been Black, she would have
been accepted to the University of Michigan. All else being equal,
had this individual been a man, she would have been accepted into
the Virginia Military Institute. All else being equal, had this individual been a Christian, he would have gotten the job. Does equal
protection analysis really have the capacity to say, all else being
equal, had this individual not been a member of this religion, he
would havefelt this way?
Religious identity alone does not drive how one feels about
government religious displays any more than racial identity alone
determines how one feels about affirmative action. As an empirical
matter, one can try to show that individuals are treated differently
based on race and religion, but purporting to show that individuals
feel and act differently based solely on race or religion incorporates
into the equal protection analysis the very stereotypes it was written
to eradicate, and reduces the breadth of human individuality to
discrete categories of difference. People simply do not feel differently about issues solely as a function of their religious identity, and
if the psychic harm a person feels as a result of a religious display is
attributable to a variety of factors, it cannot simultaneously be
attributable solely to their religious or nonreligious identity. There
can be no coherent violation of equal protection when the connection between the differential treatment and membership in a suspect
class is unclear and attenuated. Moreover, a rule that the Equal
Protection clause is violated whenever an individual feels discriminated against would be unenforceable for vagueness, as there is no
way to know in advance how all Black people, or all women, or all
non-Christians will feel about a given action. Thus, neither general
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equal protection analysis, nor this article's proposed equal protection
test, recognizes psychic harms as capable of constituting differential
treatment under the equal protection clause.
Applying this test to passive displays would eliminate
Supreme Court oversight of local holiday and commemorative
displays, unless those displays had a non-psychic impact. In the
absence of non-psychic impact, the question of the role of religion in
governance and the degree of religious sentiment appropriate in the
public square would be left to the discretion of individual communities, the temperament of the majority of the people, and the ballot
box. For some, this is a cause for immediate outcry, because a person seeing a criche on the courthouse steps or the Ten Commandments on the wall of the courthouse may feel that they are political
outsiders, may worry that they will face discrimination from the
government,82 or may feel disparaged. Many Republicans felt that
way when Obama was elected president. Many Democrats felt that
way when Bush was re-elected. Many independents have always felt
that way. Almost everyone who has ever had their side lose in an
election has been made to feel that the winners were the "political
insiders" and the losers were the political outsiders, and almost
every minority in America has felt disparaged and feared unequal
treatment when a political party insensitive to their perspective has
taken office.
This is the reality of life in a diverse democracy; people with
whom we disagree nevertheless have the right to vote, and sometimes, (for minorities, most of the time) they win. It is far from
intuitive that the Constitution should provide a remedy beyond the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal treatment when this
happens. More importantly, neither law nor logic justifies limiting
the right to this remedy to nonreligious minorities when other
minorities in this country, who have much longer and more tragic

" See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (suggesting that being made to feel like a political
outsider because of religion is a core violation of the Establishment Clause).
82 See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1121 (10th Cir.
2010)
(suggesting that religious symbols on police vehicles may cause non-adherents to
fear unequal treatment by police).
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histories of political exclusion, are denied a similar remedy.83 If the
Court plans, at this late date, to enforce group based anti-subordination principles, the intractability of racial discrimination in America
suggests that racial minorities, rather than non-religious minorities,
should be first in line.
Moreover, given the muddled history of the Establishment
Clause, the constitutional infirmity of the principle of secularity and
the religious diversity of this nation, equal protection seems to be
the only clear route through the mire. This is not to deny that religion is different, but to suggest that that difference must be defined
in ways that are compatible with our traditions and our aspirations.
While we have long accorded great weight to religious freedom, we
have also long rejected fear and distrust as a valid excuse for group
discrimination. It is past time for the Supreme Court to recall that
religion holds no monopoly on discrimination and intolerance, and it
is these, not religion, that are the true enemies of democracy.
Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence threatens to reify in law
the very things it claims to denounce by protecting secularity at the
expense of diversity and equality.

VI.

CONCLUSION

"(W)hile unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive
and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial
restraint, the only check upon the exercise of our own power is our
own sense of self restraint." 84
"In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place,
oblige it to control itself." 5
83

See NAACP. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no

violation of equal protection for African-Americans when the confederate flag is
flown from the state capital, though it sent a message to African-Americans that
the state endorsed racial discrimination and that African-Americans were political
outsiders).
84 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
85 THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, at 247 (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) (Kindle ed.).
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Some things are not constitutional issues that can be settled
for all time for all people. The incoherence of the Establishment
Clause tests suggests that defining an acceptable level of religiosity
for the entire nation is one of those things. The fact that the Court
has the power to make constitutional proclamations in this field does
not mean that such proclamations are either truly constitutional or
proclamations that should be made. In times past, the Court has won
much praise for flying in the face of convention to protect minorities
from tangible harms. At other times, the Court has incurred much
criticism by continuing down erroneous paths in the name of protecting its own institutional legitimacy.
Somewhere along the way, as right or wrong the country
bowed to its pronouncements, the Court appears to have forgotten
that perhaps the most important value it is charged with protecting is
democracy.86 Setting aside democracy because a powerless minority
would otherwise suffer tangible harm is one thing. Setting aside
democracy because the Court has a different view of the role of
religion in public life than certain communities is something else
entirely. Abandoning the Lemon and endorsement tests and getting
out of the field of passive displays could be the Court's first step in
recalling that if democracy means anything, it must mean that "we
the people" are the sovereign. They are the sovereign because they
are "we the people," not because their values are secular.

86 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States, in Order to form a

more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.").

